1. INTRODUCTION In this paper, we present a general analysis of the War of Attrition in continuous time with complete information. In this game, each of two players must choose a time at which he plans to concede in the event that the other player has not already conceded. The return to conceding decreases with time, but, at any time, a player earns a higher return if the other concedes first. The game was introduced by Maynard Smith (1974) to study the evolutionary stability of certain patterns of behavior in animal conflicts. It has subsequently been applied by economists to a variety of economic conflicts such as price wars (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole 1986 , Ghemawat and Nalebuff 1985 , Kreps and Wilson 1982 and bargaining (Ordover and Rubinstein 1985, Osborne 1985) ' Most authors have assumed specific functional forms for the payoffs. The only general analysis of the equilibria of this game in continuous time with complete information is by Bishop and Cannings (1978) . They study a general symmetric game, but restrict the equilibrium analysis to symmetric Nash equilibria which satisfy a certain stability p r~p e r t y .~ This paper generalizes their model to allow for asymmetric return functions and arbitrary payoffs in the event that neither player ever concedes. We provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the game and present the assumptions which define the War of Attrition. In Section 3, we state the main theorems and heuristically describe the logic behind the proofs. In Section 4, we relate our analysis to some of the applications which have appeared in the economics literature. Section 5 contains the proofs of the theorems presented in Section 3. Section 6 concludes with a brief discussion of how the analysis changes when time is made discrete.
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Most of these models incorporate some degree of incomplete information. The method of analysis is similar, but the set of eq~~ilibria is sometimes substantially reduced.
The equilibrium concept is known as evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). Following Selton (1980) , a strategy r is said to be evol~~tionary stable if (i) r is a best reply to itself and (ii) for any alternative best reply r' to r, r is a better reply to r' than r' is to itself.
THE GAME
Two players. n and b, must decide when to make a single move at some time t between 0 and I." The payoffs are determined as soon as one player moves. In what follows, x refers to an arbitrary player and to the other player. If player a moves first at some time t , he is called the leader and earns a return of L,(t) . If the other player moves first at time t , then player x is called the f o l l o~~e r and earns a return of F,(t). If both players move simultaneously at time t , the return to player Y is Sz(t).
In the strategic forin of the game. a pure strategy for player a is a time t , E [O, I] at which he plans to niove given that neither player moves before that time. Given a strategy pair (t,, 17,) E [0, 11 x [0, 11, the payoff to player a is then defined as follows: 2 1 4sstrr~ptlorls on the? Pcrjoff Fzrnctlonv. Our first assumption guarantees that the payoff' filnctions are continuous everywhere but on the diagonal.
(A1)
L, and F, are continuous functions on [0,
Gaines \vith this structure are generally called "noisy" games of timing6 Notice that we impose no differentiability conditions on either of these functions. Our next assumption characterizes the War of Attrition.
(.42) (1) F,(t) > L,(t) for t c (0. 1); (11) ~, ( t ) > S,(t) for t E 10, 1):
Condition (i) requires that the return to following at any time t > 0 strictly exceed the return to leading at time t. We d o not rule out the possibility that 'This is just a normali7ation. A game Lvith an infinite horizon can be converted into this framework h) a ch'lngc of kariable such as r = ,-( 1 + :). where -E [O, z) . See Section 4 on s i~~l p l e the appllcntions of this mndcl for Inore discussion on this point.
' I: is not ttqsentlal that F z ( l )and L , ( I )be defined since the only return which can be realized at time I is S,(l). Defining Lz(t)t o be continuous at I merely allows us to identify lim,., L,(t) with L,(l).
Similarl! for F, " The _games are called " n o~s ) " bccausc the payoff to the follower depends only on when the other player moles. This I-eflects the assumption that a player who plans to Lvalt until time t to move does not hake to roiiriliit himself to moving ~~n t i l he has observed the liistor) of the game up to time t.
ConsequentI>. ~f the other player moves before time r, tlie first player can react opt~mally. independentl) of \\hat he had planned to d o had the other player not moved a t time 1. A "silent" game of timlng is one In which each player must cornmit himself to a time at which he will move independently of tlie action of tlie other at the outset of the game. Silent games of timing have been also been irred in econornic rnodels (r.g. Reingan~rm 1981a (r.g. Reingan~rm . 1981b ).
L,(O) = F,(O) or the possibility that F,(l) = L,(l). Condition (ii), however, requires that the return to following strictly exceed the return to tying at all times less than 1. Combined with condition (iii), these conditions imply that, at any time t < 1, each player prefers to wait if the other player plans to move but, if forced to move first, would prefer to move sooner than later. Note, however, that, since S , is not necessarily continuous, our assumptions impose no restrictions on the relation of S,(1) to either L,(1) or F,(l). Consequently, S,(1) may reflect the equilibrium payoff of arqjl continuation game which is played whenever both players wait until time 1.
Although not necessary for our analysis, it will also be convenient to ignore the special case in which return to leading at time O is exactly equal to the terminal return.
In Figure 1 , we have illustrated three possible relations between the return functions. In each case, the return functions are normalized so that S,(1) = 0. As required by Assumption A2, in each case the value of F, lies above L, over the open interval (0, 1) with L, strictly decreasing throughout. c) illustrates the case where the return to leading actually falls below the return at time 1 before time 1 is reached. We will return to each of these examples again in our discussion of the applications. Although not illustrated. Assumption A2 requires that S, must also lie below F , over the interval (0, 1). However, it is not necessary that F, be decreasing.
2.2. Equilibriur?~. It is important for our results to permit agents to randomize across pure strategies. A rizised str.ategjl for player x is a probability distribution function G, on [0, 11.' If we extend the domain of the payoff functions to the set of all pairs of mixed strategies in the obvious way, then a strategy combination (G:, G: ) is an eqtlilibriilt~z if Pa((?:, GF) 2 Pa(G,, GF) for all mixed strate-
For the remainder of the paper, (G,, G,) will refer to an equilibrium combination, and q,(t) will denote the probability with which player x moves at exactly time t . We will repeatedly use the fact that if (G,. G,) is a pair of equilibrium distributions, then P,(t, Gp) = up,^^,,, ^ P,(v, Go) for any t in the support of G,.
' By a probability distribution on [ t , I], we mean any right-continuous nondecreasing function G from ( -x. I:] to LO. 11 with G(r) = 0 for t i 0 and G(1) = 1. Throughout this paper, we will adopt the convention that That is. the integral does not include a mass point at time r , indift'erent to moving at any time in the interior of the support then defines a pair of integral equations which determine the equilibrium strategies up to somc "end point" conditions. The requirements for these endpoint conditions provide the necessary and sufficient for the existence of a nondegenerate equilibrium.
T o state these conditions, wc require some additional notation. Define
Note that Assumption ( A l ) implies that Ii,(s. t) is well defined everywhere except
Before explaining thcse conditions, we will proceed with a characterization of the nondegenerate equilibria they imply.
T H E~I < E~( 6 , .G,) is trri ei~uilihriui~z \i,itll q,(
oril! ifr/le c.orlditioizs of Tlieoiri~z2 are satisfied crizcl:
Coi1sidt
.i first the statement of Theorem 3. Condition (a) is an "initial" condition which states that at most one player can move with positive probability at time 0 . Since. by Assumption (A2). the return to follou~ing exceeds the return to tying at tiiiie 0. i t always pays at least one player to wait an instant. Condition (b) gives the integral equation which defines the equilibrium strategies after time 0. Both players move according to a continuous increasing probability distribution up to sorue time t , after which they wait until the end of the game. The requirement that player a be willing to move at any point in the interval (0, t , ) implies
Consider next the statement of Theorem 2. Condition (a) is necessary and sufficient for equation (3.1) to define a strictly increasing function. It will be satisfied whenever the return to following at time 0 strictly exceeds the return to following. Condition (b) gives the three possibilities for the strategies defined by Condition (b) of Theorem 3 to be best responses. Condition (b)(i) corresponds to Condition (b)(i) of Theorem 3. In this case. there is a time at which both players earn returns to leading that equal their terminal returns. Setting t , equal to this time then makes both players indifferent between moving at any time in the interval (0. t , ) and waiting until the end of the game.
Conditions (b)(ii) and (b)(iii) correspond to Condition (b)(ii) of Theorem 3. In this case each player p moves according to the distribution function G,, throughout the game. This strategy pair forms a pair of best responses if and only if one of two conditions is satisfied. One possibility is for hotlz players to eventually move with probability 1 making the terminal payoff to other irrelevant. The other possibility is for only player x to eventually move with probability one. In this case, the terminal .return to player p is irrelevant, but. for the strategy of player x to be optimal. he must not prefer to wait until the end of the game.
Consequently, we require that L,(1) 2 S,(l). Condition (b) then follows upon observing that eq~lation (3.1) implies that limtTl G,(t) = 1 if and only if Iz(l. 1) = 0. Notice that both Conditions (b)(i) and (b)(ii) might be satisfied simultaneously. In thesc cases, there are two one parameter families of equilibria which differ according to whether there is a gap in the supports of the equilibrium distributions.
3.3. Suhgarne Pei:fectiorl. Many of the applications of the war of attrition arise in situations in which the players cannot coninlit themselves to the time at which they plan to move at the beginning of the game. In these cases. a decision to move at time t is actually a decision to move,first at time t, given that neither player has already moved by that time. For these games, it may be desirable to refine the equilibrium concept to incorporate the implications of subgame perfection.
T o use this concept. however, we must first extend the concept of a strategy to specify the plans of the player upon reaching any time t. As defined in Section 2, the game is in a reduced normal form in that the strategies d o not necessarily specify the plans of a player who deviates from his intended action. If the player does not plan to move before time t with probability 1. then we may use Bayes rule to derive the strategy of the player at time r. Otherwise, at every time t for which Bayes does not determine the plan of the player, we must specify a new distribution function stating the strategy of the player for the subgame starting at that time. 111 the interest of space, we will avoid the details of a precise specification of this larger strategy space and present only heuristic arguments.
Note first that equation (3.1) implies that, for any t < 1, there is a positive probability that it will be reached in any nondegenerate equilibrium. It follows immediately, therefore, that every nondegenerate equilibrium is subgame perfect. For the same reason, any degenerate equilibrium in which both players wait until time 1 is also subgame perfect. Consequently, the only cases in which subgame perfection may be restrictive is when one of the players moves immediately with probability 1. In these cases, subgame perfection not only eliminates some equilibria, but, as Fudenberg et al. and Ghemawat and Nalebuff have shown, it may even eliminate degenerate equilibrium outcomes as well.
A general characterization of the subgame perfect equilibrium may be stated as follows. 
T o understand these conditions, we note that there are two ways in which a degenerate outcome might be made subgame perfect. The first is for the players to adopt a nondegenerate equilibrium if the game reaches time t > 0. This is possible if and only if condition (b) of Theorem 2 is satisfied. The other possibility is for player a to plan to move with probability 1 upon reaching any time t up to the time t* where his return to leading equals his terminal return. Thereafter, he waits until the terminal time with probability 1. In response, player P must adopt a strategy which makes this optimal. Here, two conditions must be satisfied. First, player /lmust not earn a higher return from leading after time t* than his terminal return. Otherwise, he will move with probability 1 upon reaching any time after t* which will lead player a to wait at time t*. Inducting on this argument then leads to an unravelling of the equilibrium. This argument yields condition (b)(ii). Second, since player P earns a lower return from leading after t* than by waiting until time 1, he will never move after t* either. Consequently, the return to player cc from leading at time t* must be no less than his terminal return. Assumption (A2) then implies condition (b)(i).
Notice that, in the absence of a nondegenerate equilibrium for any subgame, Theorem 4 implies that it is subgame perfect for some player to move immediately only if and only if L,(O) > S,(l) for some player a. Thus, in this case, the two types of degenerate equilibrium outcomes are mutually exclusive. Either one of the players moves with probability 1 at time 0 or both players wait until time 1.
We should point out that in working in continuous time, there are some additional subtleties that do not arise in the discrete time analogues. The problem is that in continuous time a player may move with zero probability at any point in an interval, but nevertheless move with positive probability over the entire interval. Consider, for instance, a game in which, upon reaching any period t, the unique subgame perfect outcome is for player a to move immediately with probability 1. Since it cannot be optimal for player a to move at any time at which player cc plans to move with probability 1, player P cannot plan to move with positive probability at any time before the terminal time. If time is discrete, this implies that he waits until the end with probability 1. If time is continuous, however, this restriction only eliminates strategies with mass points. It does not rule out a strictly increasing, continuous distribution function which rises at rate sufficiently low so that player cr always prefers to move immediately upon reaching any time t. Consequently, we are left with an infinity of subgame perfect equilibria.
NONDEGENERATE EQUILIBRIA IN ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS
In any interesting application of this game, the return to leading at time 0 will exceed his terminal return for at least one of the players. In this case, there is always a subgame perfect degenerate equilibrium in which one of the players moves immediately. The focus of most of the attention in the literature, however, has been on the nondegenerate equilibria.'' In this section, we discuss the kinds of economic applications for which nondegenerate equilibria are likely to exist.
Ignoring for the moment, the integral condition at time 0, the class of economic applications for which nondegenerate equilibria exist can roughly be divided into those which satisfy Condition (b)(i) of Theorem 2 and those which satisfy Condition (b)(ii). One important class of applications which generally satisfy both conditions are those which require an infinite horizon. Suppose, for instance, that all of the return functions decline at an exponential rate 6. Then, if we transform time according to the formula z = t/[t + 11, simple calculations reveal that not only is F,(1) = L,(1) = S,(1) = 0 as in Figure l(a) , but Ip(l, 1) = 0 as well. In this case, there is a one parameter family of equilibria in which both players move over the entire interval according to a continuous distribution function.
Condition (b)(ii) may also be satisfied for some applications with a finite horizon if the net return to following depends on the amount of time remaining in the game. In their continuous time version of the "chain store" paradox, for example, Kreps and Wilson (1982) assume that a contest for a market between two firms takes place over a predetermined interval (0, 1). They also assume that the benefit from following over leading is proportional to 1-t and that the cost of leading (in their case leaving the market) is proportional to t. Simple calculations again reveal that Ip(l, 1) = 0. Consequently, under complete information, their model possesses a one parameter family of nondegenerate equilibria in which one of the players is certain to concede by time 1." For most economic applications which require a finite horizon, however, the 'O There are exceptions. Kornhauser, Rubinstein, and Wilson (1987) , for example, argue for selecting the degenerate equilibria.
" This game may also possess another family of nondegenerate equilibria. If the firms were to play a sequence of tz such contests (see Fudenberg and Kreps 1985) . the terminal payoff to each firm at the end of the kth contest would represent its equilibrium payoff from playing the remaining PI-k contests. If this is nonzero and returns are symmetric, the family of nondegenerate equilibria described in condition (i) of Theorem 2 also exists. Notice that in this equilibrium, the behavior of the firms in the kth contest depends on their behavior in subsequent contests through the value of the terminal payoffs.
return to following stays bounded above the return to leading. Consequently, neither Condition (b)(ii) nor (b)(iii) is satisfied, and the only possibility for establishing the existence of an equilibrium is to satisfy Condition (b)(i). There are two reasons why this condition might not be satisfied. The first is that the return to leading at any finite time may strictly exceed the terminal return. For instance, in the oil exploration example studied by Wilson (1983) , if the firm has not drilled its lease by a certain time, it loses the lease. In this case, there is no nondegenerate equilibrium because truncating the horizon introduces a downward discontinuity in the payoffs at time 1 as in Figure l The second reason nondegenerate equilibria may not exist is that, even in games where the return to leading eventually falls below the terminal return as in Figure l(c) , the return to leading must equal the terminal return at exactlj~the scrtne time ,for both players. This property is likely to hold only for symmetric games. Consequently, unless there is a special reason to assume that returns are symmetric, such as in the biology models, we should not expect to find a nondegenerate equilibrium. Two economic applications where this result is of interest is in the patent race model of Fudenberg et al. (1983) and the exit model by Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) . In both of these models, returns are assumed to be asymmetric and, as a result, the nondegenerate equilibria of Theorem 2 are eliminated.
Finally, consider the implications of the integral condition at time 0. In most applications, the return to following strictly exceeds the return to leading at time 0, so that this condition is satisfied. In some cases, however, particularly where the war of attrition is a subgame of a larger game, this condition is less plausible. For example, Hendricks (1987) studies a model of adoption of a new technology in which there are both first and second-mover advantages. Each firm must choose a time at which to adopt. The return functions are continuous and have the property that, initially the returns to leading are increasing, and exceed the returns to following. During this period, first-mover advantages dominate the second-mover advantages. and each firm has an incentive to preempt. Eventually, l~owever. the return to leading decreases, falling below the return to following, so that the second-mover advantage dominates. Consequently, if L, is decreasing at the point of intersection of F, and L,, then Condition (a) of Theorem 2 is not satisfied and hence there are no nondegenerate equilibria for this subgame.
THE TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
We begin by establishing the relation between the supports of the strategies of the two players.
LEMMA1. Silppose G,(t,) = G,(t2) < 1for t , > t,. Then Gg(tl) = Go(t2+ 6)for sorlle 6 > 0.
PROOF. Suppose G,(t,) = G,(t2) < 1 for 1, < t, and choose c E (0, 1, -1,) .
Then. for any t E (t, + c, t,], it follows from Assumption A2 that player prefers to move at time t, + t: than to move at t since there is no chance that player cc will move in the intervening interval:
Furthermore, for any E , > 0 sufficiently small, right-continuity of G, implies that there is an arbitrarily small 6 > 0 such that G,(t, + 6) -G,(t,) < E,. It then follows from Assumptions A1 and A2 that, for t E (t,, t 2 + 6), Letting c -0, \ve may then conclude that for any t E (t,, t, + 61, there is an earlier time D E (t,, t) at which player prefers to move.
Q.E.D.
The next Lemma rules out any mass point after time 0 but before either player moves with probability 1.
LEMMA 2. For t 6 (0, I), lim, G,(v) < 1 implies q,(t) = 0.
PROOF. Suppose, for some t E (0, I), that q,(t) > 0. Then, for any E > 0, there is an (arbitrarily small) 6 > 0 such that (i) Lp(t -6) -Lp(t + 6) < E, and (ii) q,(t + 6) = 0 with G,(t + 6) -G,(t -6) < q,(t) + E . It then follows from Assumptions A1 and A2 that, for E and 6 chosen sufficiently small,
Consequently, player will never move in the interval (t -6, t]. This implies that G,(r -6) = Gp(t) Then, if lim,,., Go(") < 1, Lemma 1 implies that G,(t -6) = G,(t), contradicting the hypothesis that q,(t) > 0.
Q.E.D.
If G, is strictly increasing over some interval, then we may use the fact that player r must be indifferent to moving at time within the interval to explicitly characterize the equilibrium strategy o f player P over this interval in terms o f the return functions Laand F,. LEMMA 3. S~ippose G, is strictly increasilzg ouer the intervcll [ t o , t , ] . Then,for to > 0 arlcl t E ( t o . t,) , G,(t) < 1 implies PROOF.Suppose that G, is strictly increasing over the interval [ t o , t , ] . Then, since G,(t) < 1 for t < t,, it follows from Lemma 2 that GI, is continuous on
,). Therefore. for any t E [ t o , t,).
Since Gp and L, are both monotonic and continuous on [ t o , t ] , we may apply the formula for integration by parts (Rudin 1964, p. 122 ) to obtain
Substituting (5.3) into (5.2) and rearranging terms then yields, for all t E [ t o , t,),
But, since [L,(r>) - 
F,(c)][l -G,)(v)]< 0 for all t*E [ t o , t ] , equation (5.4) implies that
Employing a change o f variable (Rudin 1964, p. 122-124) , we may then apply the fundamental theorem o f calculus to obtain:
Taking antilogs and rearranging terms then yields equation (5.1).
Note that, i f L, is continuously differentiable, equation (5.1) is simply the solution to the differential equation \vith initial condition Gp(to). In this case, Gp has a continuous density function g, over the interval ( t o , t ,)
. W e establish next that i f neither player moves with probability 1 at time 0, then the game cannot end with certainty until time 1.
PROOF. Let t^ = sup ( t 2 0 : G,(t) < 1 for a = a, b ) be the earliest time by which one of the players plans to move with certainty. The lemma is equivalent to the requirement that t^ i(0, 1 ) . Suppose 0 < t^ < 1.
We will show first that the strategy of a t least one of the players must have a mass point at time f. Suppose not. Then, for some player P, GI, is strictly increasing over an interval (t', fi and limrT, Gp(t)= 1. Then, for any t E (t', 8,Lemma 3 combined with Assumption A2 implies that G, is strictly increasing over (t ', t) . Combining Lemma 3 with Assumption A2 again. we then obtain that limrTi
But, if L~~( : )
> 0, then Lemma 2 implies that lim,., G,(t) = 1. The definition of t then implies that G, is strictly increasing over some interval (t', i) . It then follows from Assumption A2 and Lemma 3.3 that limtAi G,(t) < 1. This contradiction proves the lemma.
Define t* = sup ( t 2 0 : G, is strictly increasing on 10, t ) for x = a, b )
to be the beginning of the first interval during which one of the players moves with probability 0. Combining Lemmata 1 and 4, we can show that, unless one of the players moves with probability 1 at time 0, neither player ever moves in the interval ( t * , 1).
PROOF. Suppose that G,(O) < 1. Then Lemma 3 and right-continuity of GI, O, t ) for 0 5 t < t * . Therefore, the lemma will -be proved if we can establish part (ii). Suppose qlJ(0)< 1 and t* < 1. Then Lemma 4 implies that G,(t*) < 1. Let
Since G,,(t*) < 1, it follows that t' I 1. We need to show that t' = 1.
Suppose first that t' = t * . Then the definition of t* implies that, for some
Since G,(t*) < 1, it then follows from Lemma 1 that GP(t3') = G,(t*), contradicting our assumption that t' = t*. Suppose next that t* < t' < 1 . Then, since Lemma 4 implies that G,(t1) < 1, it follows from Lemma 2 that Gp(t*)= Gp(t')< 1. But then Lemma 1 implies that, for some 6 > 0, G,(t*) = G,(t' + 6) < 1. Applying Lelnma 1 again then yields GB(t*)= GIJ(t1 + 6),contradicting the definition oft'.
Lemma 5 implies that the support of the equilibrium strategies is composed of at most an interval 10. 
Restrictions on the Value o f t*. the equilibrium restrictions implied by the value o f t*.
These are determined by comparing the payoKto a player from moving at or before time t* with his payoff from ivaiting until time 1. Given Assumption A3, there are two cases to consider as determined by the value o f t * .
E~juilibi~i~rnz
In this section, we consider
PROOF. Suppose t* = 0.
( i ) I f q,(O) = 0, then it follows from Lemma 5 that q,(l) = 1. Therefore, G, is an optimal response only i f 
Recall that Ip(O, 0 ) = l i m t I ,Ip(O, t).
PROOF. 
PROOF. T h e proof o f part (i) follows again from Lemma 5 and the requirment that G , be right-continuous. T o establish (ii). note that G, is an optimal response only i f
Lemma 5 implies that q,)(l)> 0 whenever I,,(l. 1 ) > 0. Therefore, (5.6) implies that L,(1) 2 S,(l). Furthermore, if 1,(1, 1) > 0, then it again follows from Lemma 5 that q,(l) > 0, in which case equation (5.5) must be satisfied for t* = 1.
5.3. Proof of Theorems. Using the restrictions derived in Lemmata 1 to 9, we can now prove the theorems stated in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
PROOF OF THEOREM The necessity of these conditions follow from Lemmata 1. 1 and 7. All that remains is to show that they are sufficient.
(i) If L,(0) 2 F,(t) for some t E [0, I), then choose the strategies so that q,(0) = 1 and q,(t) = 1. Then, for any v E (0, 11,
which implies that Gp is an optimal response. And
which implies that G, is an optimal response. If L,(0) 2 S,(l), then a similar argument establishes that q,(O) = 1 and qp(t)= 1 form a pair of best responses.
(ii) If L,(O) IS,(1) and q,(l) = 1 for cr = a, b, then, for any t < 1, which implies that q,(l) = 1 is an optimal response.
PROOF OF THEOREM The necessity of Condition (a) follows from Lemmata 2. 8(i) and 9(i). The necessity of Condition (b) follows from Parts (ii) of Lemmata 8 and 9. The sufficiency of these conditions then follows upon verifying that one of the strategy pairs defined in Theorem 3 are equilibria.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3. The necessity of Condition (a) follows from Lemma 6. The necessity of Condition (b) follows from Parts (ii) of Lemmata 8 and 9. The sufficiency of these conditions then follow upon verifying that one of the strategy pairs defined in Theorem 3 are equilibria.
Hendricks and Wilson (1985a Wilson ( , 1985b have studied the equilibrium properties of Wars of Attrition in discrete time and investigated the relation between the equilibria of these games to the equilibria of the continuous time analogues. In this paper, we confine ourselves to some remarks about the differences between the two formulations as they pertain to our characterization theorems.
In both formulations, the same degenerate equilibrium outcomes obtain under roughly the same conditions, although as noted in Section 3.3, the number of subgame perfect equilibria tends to be much larger when time is continuous. Moreover, when the horizon is infinite, the class of nondegenerate equilibria in the continuous time model essentially coincides with the discrete time model. In both cases, there is an equilibrium corresponding to any initial condition in which only one of the players moves with positive probability at time 0.
When the horizon is finite, however, the set of nondegenerate equilibria may diverge substantially. First, in discrete time, there is generally a t most one nondegenerate equilibrium, corresponding to the continuous time equilibrium in which neither player moves with positive probability a t time 0. In contrast, when time is continuous, the existence of a single nondegenerate equilibrium implies the existence of a continuum of nondegenerate equlibria.12 Second, there is always an equilibrium in discrete time whenever the terminal return lies below the return to leading at any time for both players. In contrast, there is no degenerate equilibrium in continuous time when the terminal return lies strictly below the return to leading as time approaches the terminal date. This failure of upper semi-continuity in the equilibrium correspondence is the result of the fact that the payoffs are not continuous in the norm topology on the space of distribution strategies.
These differences in the set of equilibria are reflected in the rich local structure of the equilibria in discrete time games which is totally lacking in the continuous time analogues. This local structure is particularly sensitive to the treatment of ties, which, in continuous time, occur with probability 0. We also note that there is no analogue to the integral conditions at time 0 in the discrete time game. 
